Readings of the Truthmaker Principle
MacBride's crucial claim is that if deflationism is true, the truthmaker principle is just an abbreviation of (C), no more than a notational variant of it. But this claim is false. For it is a mistake to take, as MacBride and Lewis do, an instance of TMP to look like: (3) It is true that p iff there exists something whose existence entails that p which then ends up being generalised via conjunction to make (C) as we saw above.
Instead, an instance looks like this:
(4) <p> is true iff <p> has a truthmaker and the corresponding generalisation corresponding to this is not (C) but:
(5) For every proposition <p>, <p> is true iff <p> has a truthmaker There are two crucial differences between (3) and (C) on the one hand and (4) and (5) on the other. First, the latter pair mention propositions and use the truth predicate '… is true', but the former don't, and instead use the truth operator `it is true that …'. Second, (C) is a conjunction of instances of the form (3), but (5) is a universal quantification of (4). But why should these technical differences matter?
They matter because the mention of propositions and the appearance of the quantifier in (5) are the result of the central motivation behind truthmaker theory.
There is good reason to think that the primary reason for believing in truthmakers does not concern the nature of truth but the nature of truthbearers like propositions. 1 The truthmaker principle should then reflect this. The basic idea is that since not all propositions are true, we need truthmakers to account for the difference between those which are true and those which are not. Propositions aren't just true. This idea is often put in more abstract terms like 'truth is grounded in reality' (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2006, 186 (7) That a sentence s means that cats purr, doesn't entail that cats purr.
In any case, the only problem for the deflationist here is whether she can make sense of propositions. It's well known that this is a tricky issue. But MacBride isn't discussing the adequacy of deflationism, but the compatibility of deflationism with the truthmaker principle, so it makes no difference to the issue at hand. The only important point here is that the deflationist can make sense of the idea that there are false truthbearers; and it seems likely that she can, whether or not she needs to appeal to propositions to do so.
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So we've seen that the deflationist can argue for the truthmaker principle on the basis of facts about propositions rather than truth, and that these arguments are perfectly compatible with deflationism. But this route is utterly invisible if, as
MacBride does, we only focus on claims like (3) and (C), because these claims only use the truth operator 'It is true that …' and so don't mention truthbearers at all.
So we've established the first reason for preferring (5) over (C).
Conjunctions and Generalisations
The second reason for preferring (5) is that it is a universal generalisation whereas (C) is an infinite conjunction. This is a good reason for preferring (5) because it reflects the fact that the central motivation for truthmaker theory discussed in the last section is a general thought about propositions as such, namely that they need truthmakers. It is familiar that universally quantified propositions are not expressed by infinite conjunctions. An infinite conjunction of the form 'a is F and b is F and …'
does not entail the corresponding universal generalisation 'Every x is F' because it does not itself entail that there isn't some further entity z, not mentioned in the infinite conjunction, which isn't F. What it needs is the so-called 'that's all' clause, which says that there is nothing else in the domain other than a, b, and so on. This can be expressed by the sentence 'For all x, x is a or x is b, or …' which will itself be infinitely long. However, (C) is an infinite conjunction without a 'that's all' clause, and so doesn't rule out a claim of the form 'p but there's nothing whose existence entails that p', which would be a clear counterexample to the truthmaker principle.
(5), on the other hand, does rule this out, because it uses a universal quantifier. So (5) makes a truly general claim about propositions as such, but (C) doesn't, and so the deflationist should choose the former not the latter.
This point may raise eyebrows, because critics (e.g. Gupta 1993) have accused deflationists of not being able to handle universal generalisations involving truth, instead erroneously offering infinite conjunctions. One of the reasons this is so tricky is that a claim like (5) involves a truth-ascription which cannot be eliminated.
If we do eliminate the ascription we either get an appearance of a singular term '<p>' which has no predicate attached, rendering the claim ungrammatical:
(8) For every proposition <p>, <p> iff <p> has a truthmaker
To fix this we could remove the angle brackets:
(9) For every proposition <p>, p iff <p> has a truthmaker But this leaves `p' unbound, since the quantifier at the beginning ranges over singular terms (namely, ones which refer to propositions) not over sentence letters. This is unacceptable. So it may seem that by insisting on adopting a universal quantification, the deflationist has shot herself in the foot.
There are two responses available here. One is to adopt Wolfgang Künne's approach to truth (Künne 2003: 337) and use sentential quantification to read (5) as:
(10) p(p iff <p> has a truthmaker)
The deflationist would then argue for the admissibility of this form of quantification. For brevity I won't discuss this strategy further but instead turn to the other.
The other strategy is to read (5) as an infinite conjunction but add a universal quantification over propositions which rules out there being further propositions which don't satisfy the claim.
(5*) (<cats purr> is true iff <cats purr> has a truthmaker) and (<dogs bark> is true iff <dogs bark> has a truthmaker) and … and for any proposition x (x = <cats purr> or x = <dogs bark> or …)
This can then be unpacked to get rid of the truth ascriptions and to unpack the predicate '… has a truthmaker' in the usual way:
(5**) (Cats purr iff there exists something whose existence entails that cats purr) and (dogs bark iff there exists something whose existence entails that dogs bark) and … and for any proposition x (x = <cats purr> or x = <dogs bark> or …)
Such a principle is amenable to the deflationist and is sufficiently general, since it has the 'that's all' clause.
There are two further comments to make regarding this last claim. Note how the 'that's all' clause, which says that any proposition you can find is one of the ones already covered in the infinite conjunction, reflects the motivation behind truthmaker theory, namely that the need for truthmakers flows from the nature of propositions in general, so that anything which counts as a proposition is to be covered by the truthmaker principle. Second, note that (5**) is identical to what we would get if we fixed (C) to make it more general by adding the 'that's all' clause it needs. This is no surprise, since the 'that's all' clause expresses the general motivation for truthmaker theory which is missing from (C) itself. It's just that (5) makes all of these points much more plain.
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The above two strategies can be used to solve the issue raised in the last section that the claim (6), which the deflationist used to express the idea that not all 4 How do we apply these same points to a restricted truthmaker principle? In the case of the conjunctions (C*) and (5*) we just eliminate those conjuncts which concern the truths which don't have truthmakers; in the case of the quantification (5) we restrict the quantification only to the truths which we think do have truthmakers.
truthbearers are true, is particular and not general. We can either apply sentential quantification:
(11) p(that <p> exists doesn't entail that p)
or we can create an infinite conjunction and add a 'that's all' clause:
(12) [(that <cats purr> exists doesn't entail that cats purr) and (that <dogs bark> exists doesn't entail that dogs bark) and …] and for any proposition x (x = <cats purr> or x = <dogs bark> or …)
Either of these offers the deflationist a suitable way of providing her general reason for believing in truthmakers. with their truthmakers? The above discussion has revealed that deflationism has no such impact: the sense in which deflationists reject that truth is a relation is compatible with accepting truthmaker theory. Deflationists will deny that truth can be elucidated or anlaysed as a relation. But the truthmaker principle doesn't need 5 The same method can be applied to the other strategy where we don't mention the existence of propositions but the fact that a sentence s means that p.
to be read as an analysis or elucidation of truth. Instead it can be read as a claim about the extension of 'is true' -it applies to all and only those propositions with truthmakers. And deflationists needn't be afraid of making claims about the extension of 'is true,' because claims about the extensions of predicates needn't be analyses of those predicates.
A deflationist can therefore assert the truthmaker principle, albeit for reasons not strictly concerning truth, and on those grounds alone say that truth is (coextensive with) the truthmaking relation in the sense that every true proposition bears the truthmaking relation to its truthmaker. But this doesn't entail that truth can be analysed in terms of truthmaking, any more than the utilitarian claim that 'goodness' is coextensive with 'utility maximising' entails that goodness can be analysed as what maximises utility.
To sum up, deflationism does not render the truthmaker principle implausible.
Deflationism doesn't entail that the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of (C). Nor does it entail that there can be no independent motivations for truthmaking, since such motivations don't concern truth but truthbearers, and deflationists can happily talk about truthbearers. So MacBride's argument fails:
